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1. ARGUMENTS, EXPLANATIONS, AND PROOFS 
 
Michel Dufour rightly observes that mathematics “brings together three crucial 
notions of human rational interaction, namely proof, argument and explanation” 
(Dufour, 2013, p. 2). He adds that these concepts “can easily overlap, at least in their 
day-to-day meaning” (ibid.). What do we know about this overlap? We know that 
there are some arguments which are neither proofs nor explanations. Beyond this, 
there is a remarkable lack of consensus about all three questions. For each pair of 
concepts, the conventional wisdom might seem to be that the terms do not overlap 
(as shown in Fig. 1). 
  
 
Figure 1: How explanations, proofs, and arguments are related according to 
conventional wisdom 
  
Although few if any discussions address all three concepts, some people have 
argued that no proofs are arguments (for example, Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 
1969; Johnson, 2000); some people have argued that no explanations are arguments 
(for example, Walton, 2004; Copi et al., 2007); and some people have argued that no 
proofs are explanations (for example, Resnik & Kushner, 1987). Each of these claims 
is either grounded in a wide practice, or at least is claimed to be so by its 
proponents. For example, Johnson states that his “requirement of a dialectical tier” 
for arguments, which he takes to disqualify proofs, “was to shift the paradigm … [to] 
examples more illustrative of the best practices” (Johnson, 2002, p. 322); a long list 
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could be compiled of critical thinking texts and argumentation theory authors who 
deny that explanations are arguments (see McKeon, 2013, n. 1, for a wide selection); 
and Resnik and Kushner claim that in actual mathematical practice, as opposed to 
philosophical reflection on that practice, explanation is “barely acknowledged” 
(Resnik & Kushner, 1987, p. 151). 
On the other hand, some people have argued that all proofs are arguments 
(for example, Van Bendegem, 2005; Aberdein, 2009) and some people have argued 
that all explanations are arguments (for example, Hempel & Oppenheim, 1948; 
McKeon, 2013). And while nobody seems to have claimed that all proofs are 
explanations, plenty of people have argued that some proofs are explanations (for 
example, Steiner, 1978; Kitcher, 1981b; Cellucci, 2008). Although each of these 
challenges to purported conventional wisdom was articulated independently, they 
share a common strategy of showing not just that the conventional wisdom was 
wrong, but that it was never conventional in the first place. 
 
 
Figure 2: How explanations, proofs, and arguments are related according to the 
challengers 
 
The profound claim in Dufour’s paper is that the three challenges are 
interlinked. If that’s right, we should expect them to stand or fall together. I take 
Dufour to be saying that they stand (as shown in Fig. 2). Clearly, not every 
combination of relationships between pairs of the three concepts will be logically 
possible. For example, if all proofs are arguments and no explanations are, or vice 
versa if all explanations are arguments and no proofs are, then no explanations can 
be proofs. But it would be logically possible, if less symmetrically pleasing, to adopt 
a hybrid position, such as all proofs are arguments but only some explanations are. 
Nonetheless, there is strong evidence for the individual components of the position 
shown in Fig. 2. Mathematicians do describe proofs as explanatory and talk about 
proofs as arguments (as Dufour has illustrated). And the textbook view of 
explanations as distinct from arguments is difficult to justify either pragmatically or 




2. VARIETIES OF EXPLANATION 
 
A diverse range of theories has been proposed to account for scientific explanation 
(Salmon, 1989). However, many of these theories are unsuitable as accounts of 
explanation in mathematics, since they make essential use of concepts which have 
no role in mathematical practice, such as causation or laws of nature. Dufour 
discusses the three best-known accounts of explanation in mathematics: those of 
Mark Steiner, Philip Kitcher and Bas van Fraassen. For Steiner, proofs are 
explanatory if they turn on a “characterizing property” of some entity, which he 
defines as “a property unique to a given entity or structure within a family or 
domain of such entities or structures” (Steiner, 1978, p. 143). For van Fraassen, 
explanations answer why-questions with reference to a contrast class—before we 
can answer, we need to know if “Why P?” is “Why P rather than Q?” or “Why P rather 
than R?” (Van Fraassen, 1977, p. 149). For Kitcher explanatory proofs unify, that is 
they derive a lot of material from a little, something he claims can be achieved by 
minimizing the number of “argument patterns” or distinctive forms of argument 
(Kitcher, 1981a, p. 520). 
 Dufour acknowledges that both Steiner’s and van Fraassen’s theories have 
been criticized as not adequate to account for mathematicians’ explanation practices 
(Dufour, 2013, pp. 5 ff.). Several authors complain that Steiner’s account of 
explanation is vulnerable to the charge that characterizing properties are often very 
difficult to find (Resnik & Kushner, 1987, p. 149; Hafner & Mancosu, 2005, p. 240; 
Cellucci, 2008, p. 206). David Sandborg argues that, since mathematical propositions 
are either necessarily true or necessarily false, Van Fraassen must assess all proofs 
as equally explanatory, thereby making the theory useless as an analysis of 
mathematicians’ practice of distinguishing some proofs as more explanatory than 
others (Sandborg, 1998, p. 613). Even if this specific feature of Van Fraassen’s 
approach could be overcome, Sandborg identifies a more general problem for why-
question theories: if you don’t understand a proof, how do you know which why-
question to ask? Conversely, for many proofs, knowing which why-question would 
elicit an explanatory answer is tantamount to knowing that answer (Sandborg, 
1998, p. 621). 
 However, Kitcher’s account has faced similarly robust criticism. Johannes 
Hafner and Paolo Mancosu have a nice example of three proofs of the same theorem, 
drawn from a graduate textbook, whereby they show that just totting up the 
numbers of schematic argument patterns not only does not identify the proof the 
textbook authors described as most explanatory, it actually misidentifies as most 
explanatory the proof the authors found least explanatory (Hafner & Mancosu, 
2008, p. 166). In general, what are sometimes called “nuclear flyswatter” proofs, in 
which a single, disproportionately powerful technique is repeatedly applied, will be 
rated highly by Kitcher, whereas elegant combinations of several distinct but simple 
techniques will not. To remedy this, Kitcher needs an account of qualitative 
differences of proof method, which he does not have. 
 Dufour alludes to an important distinction which I believe has previously 
been overlooked in the context of mathematical explanation, that between trace, 
strategic and deep explanation (Dufour, 2013, p. 6). This originates in the literature 
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on expert systems, whence it was retrieved by Douglas Walton (Walton, 2004, p. 73; 
cf. Clancey, 1983; Southwick, 1991; Ye, 1995):  
 
1. Reasoning trace explanations: … explain why a conclusion was reached, or a 
decision made, by describing the reasoning steps that led to the conclusion. … 
2. Strategic explanations: rather than explaining a result by listing rules used, 
these explanations describe the strategy employed by the problem solver. 
Strategic explanation give the user an insight into the problem-solving 
methodology.  
3. Deep explanations: deep, or model-based explanations justify system results by 
linking them to a deep, causal1 model. Thus, deep explanations attempt to give 
the underlying reasons for an action or state. (Southwick, 1991, p. 2)  
 
Perhaps surprisingly, explaining a mathematical proof and explaining the output of 
an expert system are very similar activities. In both cases a result is obtained as the 
end state of protracted ratiocination. This is quite unlike the characteristic situation 
in natural science, where the item requiring explanation is a naturally occurring 
phenomenon, not the product of a reasoning process. Following that process (trace 
explanation) or even stating why specific steps were chosen over others (strategic 
explanation) cannot provide full understanding of why the result is correct (deep 
explanation). Dufour rightly emphasizes the importance of that understanding 
(Dufour, 2013, p. 7); in order to say more about how it is obtained we need to say 
what deep explanations comprise. The existing theories of mathematical 
explanation attempt this task but, as we have seen, with limited success. In the final 
section I will make a new proposal for the analysis of deep explanation in 
mathematics. 
 
3. EXPLANATION AND EXPLICATION 
 
There is something reflexive to the project of writing about explanation, since 
ultimately one seeks to explain it. One strategy for diminishing this appearance of 
circularity originates with the work of Rudolf Carnap. He distinguishes between 
explanation and explication. Explanation is a relationship between a fact or natural 
phenomenon and its ostensible explanation. Explication is a process of clarification 
or conceptual analysis. Carnap proposes four requirements which good explications 
should meet:  
 
1. The explicatum [the thing which explicates] is to be similar to the explicandum 
[the thing requiring explication] in such a way that, in most cases in which the 
explicandum has so far been used, the explicatum can be used; however, close 
similarity is not required, and considerable differences are permitted.  
                                                        
1 Although this version of the distinction references a causal model, the reference is inessential: the 
expert systems at issue happened to involve activities (auditing, diagnosing) naturally explained 
causally, so an appropriate deep explanation would be causal. In non-causal domains deep 
explanation would be non-causal. Not every presentation uses ‘causal’—Walton, for example, omits 
it—and the expert systems themselves are inferential not causal. 
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2. The characterization of the explicatum, that is, the rules of its use (for instance, 
in the form of a definition), is to be given in an exact form, so as to introduce the 
explicatum into a well-connected system of scientific concepts.  
3. The explicatum is to be a fruitful concept, that is, useful for the formulation of 
many universal statements (empirical laws in the case of a nonlogical concept, 
logical theorems in the case of a logical concept).  
4. The explicatum should be as simple as possible; this means as simple as the 
more important requirements (1), (2), (3) permit (Carnap, 1950, p. 7).  
 
So the task of the philosopher studying explanation is not to explain it but to 
explicate it: to construct a simple, fruitful and exact model which is demonstrably 
similar to the actual practice of explanation. Success in this task would yield more 
than a description, it should also be normative: practice that departed from the 
model could be criticized for so doing. Each of the accounts of mathematical 
explanation claims to have such a model, but none of them is a good fit with all four 
criteria. Perhaps the mistake has been to look too far afield; could explication itself 
act as deep mathematical explanation?  
 As yet no philosopher of mathematics appears to have argued that 
mathematical explanation just is explication, but some have defended a view of 
mathematics as explicatory. For example, “I would like to claim that the basic 
similarity between philosophy and mathematics is the focus on the explication of 
informal concepts” (Kuipers, 2005, p. 170) or “getting a clearly articulated grasp of 
the concepts is not merely prerequisite for mathematical knowledge: it is the whole 
story” (Eagle, 2008, p. 69). Conversely, some people have made the same point in 
the opposite direction, for example by arguing that philosophical explication 
resembles mathematical reasoning: “conceptual analysis, as exemplified by the 
famous Gettier programme in the analysis of knowledge, has the heuristic form of 
proofs and refutations that [the philosopher of mathematics] Lakatos identifies” 
(Harper, 2012, p. 236). So an explicative account of mathematical explanation would 
be continuous with a plausible position in the philosophy of mathematics.  
 Some new empirical research provides stronger support for this account. I 
recently collaborated in the design of a study in which 255 mathematicians were 
asked to characterise a proof of their choice using 80 different adjectives that have 
often been used to describe mathematical proofs (Inglis & Aberdein, 2013). A five-
point Likert scale was provided for each adjective and the responses were subjected 
to a principal components analysis. The adjectives lined up on four major 
dimensions, which we characterized as aesthetics, intricacy, precision, and utility. 
The relevance of this study for present purposes concerns the position of 
‘explanatory’ with respect to these four dimensions. The study suggests that 
explanatoriness is a multi-dimensional concept: it was positively correlated with 
precision and (more weakly) utility, negatively correlated with intricacy, and not 
correlated with aesthetics. That’s to say, the mathematicians who completed the 
study expected explanatory proofs to be precise, useful and not intricate. Or, in 
other words, simple, fruitful and exact. The deep mathematical explanation to be 
found in mathematicians’ descriptions of proofs is, in Carnap’s sense, not 
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